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NYT Admits Saddam Preserved Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Programs

Posted by iusbvision on November 21, 2006

How many times did we hear it from the antique media that “Saddam had no WMD or programs to make them” which translated into the whole “Bush lied people died” nonsense? I have many articles in my archive (and our friends at Google have them cashed) that tell us over and over again that not only did Saddam not have WMD, but that he did not have the programs for them either. Those of us who actually read the inspection team reports knew better.

The David Kay inspection team and the Charles Duelfer inspection team found labs, equipment, personnel and documents that demonstrated Saddam was preserving some WMD programs in static for the purpose of waiting until the heat was off so he could start producing them again. These were programs that Hans Blix and his team were unable to find using the old inspection regime.

Here are some excerpts from Kay Inspection Team Report:

We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN.

With regard to Iraq’s nuclear program, the testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons. They have told ISG that Saddam Hussein remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons.

A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.

New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.

Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists’ homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).

According to the Duelfer Inspection Team Report while Saddam’s nuclear program was somewhat degraded by the loss of personnel over the years “Saddam preserved the intellectual capital of his old nuclear program” and “was only six months away from producing mustard gas” and had the “capability to produce nerve agents in significant quantities within two years.” The Iraq Survey Group Report also states that development of long-range missiles, banned under the 17 UN resolutions passed between 1991 and 2003, continued unabated.

So this brings us to the New York Times. The Times published an article on November 3, 2006 (just in time for election day but I am sure that is just a total coincidence) that was intended to slam the Bush Administration for releasing Iraqi intelligence documents on the internet that included plans for nuclear and chemical weapons that were so advanced that most any country, including Iran, could have used them.

New York Times:

On Sept. 20, the site posted a much larger document, “Summary of technical achievements of Iraq’s former nuclear program.” It runs to 51 pages, 18 focusing on the development of Iraq’s bomb design. Topics included physical theory, the atomic core and high-explosive experiments. By early October, diplomats and officials said, United Nations arms inspectors in New York and their counterparts in Vienna were alarmed and discussing what to do.

The government had received earlier warnings about the contents of the Web site. Last spring, after the site began posting old Iraqi documents about chemical weapons, United Nations arms-control officials in New York won the withdrawal of a report that gave information on how to make tabun and sarin, nerve agents that kill by causing respiratory failure.

The documents, he added, could perhaps help Iran or other nations making a serious effort to develop nuclear arms, but probably not terrorists or poorly equipped states. The official, who requested anonymity because of his agency’s rules against public comment, called the papers “a road map that helps you get from point A to point B, but only if you already have a car.”

Among the dozens of documents in English were Iraqi reports written in the 1990’s and in 2002 for United Nations inspectors in charge of making sure Iraq abandoned its unconventional arms programs after the Persian Gulf war. Experts say that at the time, Mr. Hussein’s scientists were on the verge of building an atom bomb, as little as a year away.

Weren’t we told that the Saddam being a year away from building a nuke was just another lie cooked up by the sinister Bush Administration? Weren’t we told that Saddam had no WMD programs? Weren’t we told that Hans Blix had made sure that there were no more programs and that Clinton had destroyed the last of Saddam’s WMD?

I have article after article that appeared prominently in most of the major newspapers in the country that said that the Kay and Duelfer inspection teams indicated that Saddam not only had no WMD, but no programs as well. USAToday even reported that the inspection teams said that Iraq had no facilities to produce WMD. Those of us that actually read the inspection team reports know that the antique media was not telling us the whole truth, but was actively painting a false picture.

The New York Times had to let the cat out of the bag so that they could take a pre-election shot at the Bush Administration.

Chuck Norton
News Analyst

20 Responses to “NYT Admits Saddam Preserved Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Programs”

  1. Erkki KochKetola said

    Once again, Chuck, please show your evidence.

    Hic Rhodus, hic saltus!

  2. Chuck Norton said

    Planet Earth to Erkki come in Erkki… one of the Kay Inspection Team Reports…. kinda like what it says in the article (try reading the article more closely as my sources are attributed), this particular section is from one of his interim progress reports. All of this stuff is publicly available Erkki, if you dont know how to use a search engine I am sure a lab tech in one of the computer labs can help you.

  3. Erkki KochKetola said

    “I have many articles in my archive (and our friends at Google have them cashed) that tell us over and over again that not only did Saddam not have WMD, but that he did not have the programs for them either.”

    “I have article after article that appeared prominently in most of the major newspapers in the country that said that the Kay and Duelfer inspection teams indicated that Saddam not only had no WMD, but no programs as well. USAToday even reported that the inspection teams said that Iraq had no facilities to produce WMD.”

    Which articles?

    I know how to use a search engine, I’m not going to dig through mountains of articles to figure out which ones you’ve picked. Also, I’ve had enough of your insulting tone. I’ve taken the occasional potshot at you, but you’ve never responded to me in a respectful manner. Enough, Chuck, start treating people with a modicum of respect.

  4. Andrew said

    Chuck.

    I have cashed checks. Saddam has never ‘cashed’ a nuclear weapon.

    “Weren’t we told that the Saddam being a year away from building a nuke was just another lie cooked up by the sinister Bush Administration? Weren’t we told that Saddam had no WMD programs? Weren’t we told that Hans Blix had made sure that there were no more programs and that Clinton had destroyed the last of Saddam’s WMD?”

    Well, maybe we were! In any case, seeing some links to some articles in the New York Times that tell us that Saddam had no WMD programs would be swell! Do you have this in your ‘massive data archive’, Chuck?

    Oh, I know. We can play a game. I’ll ask a question, and you answer it with data from your massive archives, OK? It’ll be like Jeopardy, but no matter who wins, you’ll always be a loser (so more like life I guess. That sucks).

    Anyway:

    1) Did we land on the moon???
    c) Who killed Kennedy? (No fair saying it was you, Chuck!)
    14) When is the Mothership coming to beam you up?
    k) What’s my shoe size?
    NUMBER ELEVEN) How much WOOD WOULD A WOOD CHUCK CHUCK IF A WOOD CHUCK COULD — CHUCK WOOD?
    NUMBER ELEVEN) How much WOOD WOULD A WOOD CHUCK CHUCK IF A WOOD CHUCK COULD — CHUCK WOOD?
    NUMBER ELEVEN) How much WOOD WOULD A WOOD CHUCK CHUCK IF A WOOD CHUCK COULD — CHUCK WOOD?
    33) Have you ever seen the movie ‘Groundhog Day’? Something reminded me of that for some reason. huh.
    2) Why are you a sloppy writer?
    90-teen) What happens at the end of the TV show ‘Friends’? I never watched it.

  5. Andrew said

    … for some reason, wordpress cut off part of my post. This leads to my next question:

    >>>) Why don’t you, like, post links to articles from these massive archives of yours (from sites that aren’t Stormfront, Freerepublic, or liberals-are-sending-this-country-to-hell-in-a-speedboat.com? I mean, if I were saying wild and crazy things, I’d sure want to be able to support my arguments, but I guess I’m just funny like that.
    IV) What’s the deal with Airline Peanuts?
    )) Do you like cranberry sauce with or without chunks? I prefer chunks, myself.
    $) Did you ever notice that the dollar sign is an S with a U through it? Ayn Rand thought this was significant. I think somebody at the treasury was bored.
    L) Along those lines, did you ever really look at the FedEx logo? Once you see what I’m talking about, you can never stop seeing it.

    So come on, impress me!

  6. Chuck Norton said

    Andrew, your comments are pretty silly.

    Just once I would like to see you make a real argument. It is obvious that you are starting to snap from getting torn to rhetorical pieces by me on this blog. Andrew, how we deal with getting beaten fair and square is a sign of good character, and I can see how you are dealing with it by your silly statements here.

  7. Andrew said

    What.

  8. Sam said

    Chuck,

    Please provide the NYT link that is the basis for your story.

    Thanks,

    Sam

  9. Andrew said

    Sam, here’s the article
    [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/03/world/middleeast/03documents.html?ei=5090&en=ba99ceafb0f67900&ex=1320210000&pagewanted=print]

    I’d like to call your attention to a few points:

    1) “But in recent weeks, the site has posted some documents that weapons experts say are a danger themselves: detailed accounts of Iraq’s secret nuclear research before the 1991 Persian Gulf war. The documents, the experts say, constitute a basic guide to building an atom bomb.”

    Key Phrase: “nuclear research before the 1991 Persian Gulf war”. For those of us who can’t add, that’s research that occurred at least 12 years prior to the 2003 invasion.

    2) “In September, the Web site began posting the nuclear documents, and some soon raised concerns. On Sept. 12, it posted a document it called “Progress of Iraqi nuclear program circa 1995.” That description is potentially misleading since the research occurred years earlier.”

    So that’s at least 8 years before the 2003 invasion.

    3) “Correction: Nov. 7, 2006

    A front-page article on Friday about concerns that certain Iraqi documents published in recent weeks by the federal government on a Web site set up in March might reveal nuclear secrets misstated the reason that Senator Pat Roberts, chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, gave for the campaign for the Web site. Mr. Roberts, Republican of Kansas, argued that the captured documents posted on the site would provide valuable information about Iraq under Saddam Hussein. He did not say that he believed they would support the idea that Mr. Hussein had resumed his unconventional arms programs before the 2003 invasion.”

    Key Phrase: “He did not say that he believed they would support the idea that Mr. Hussein had resumed his unconventional arms programs before the 2003 invasion.”

    I think that pretty much destroys the idea that the “NYT Admits Saddam Preserved Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Programs”, but the fun doesn’t end there! There’s much more!

    A) I couldn’t find a “Kay Inspection Team Report” on Google. The only hits I got for “Kay Inspection Team Report” were links to your posts in this blog. Weird, huh?

    I did find a transcript from some testimony Kay gave to various House Committees (which you can find here: [http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/pdf/davidkay.pdf])

    I’m pretty sure this is the report you refer to, but since you didn’t really cite your source, I’m not positive.

    A quote from the testimony “We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say
    definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our
    only task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons
    based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis.
    Why are we having such difficulty in finding weapons or in reaching a confident conclusion that
    they do not exist or that they once existed but have been removed? Our search efforts are being
    hindered by six principal factors:” (and Kay goes on about several theories, including the bit you quoted on safe houses).

    Very explicitly, Kay said that “We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say
    definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our
    only task is to find where they have gone.” So there was, in fact, no conclusion that there were WMDs in Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion.

    In addition, I’d like to point out that Kay resigned from the Iraq Survey Group in 2004, saying “My summary view, based on what I’ve seen, is that we are very unlikely to find large stockpiles of weapons. I don’t think they exist.” [http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4996218], you can listen to the interview where Kay says this here: [http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1615880]

    So Chuck, maybe you’re confused about what a newspaper is supposed to do. I’ll go ahead and clear this up: a newspaper is supposed to report news, so it’s a paper that has news printed on it (hence the name). The President of the United States lying to his country about his purposes for a war is news. Some people might even say it’s bigger news than the President of the United States getting blown by an intern, but they’re probably crazy liberals, and who cares what they think?

  10. Andrew said

    So it looks like enclosing URLs in brackets ([]) doesn’t circumvent moderation.

    Please don’t take 2 days to approve the post, like you did last time. Thanks.

  11. Erkki KochKetola said

    Andrew:

    Chuck is referring to the “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” commonly known as the Duelfer Report. Unfortunately, the CIA has seen fit to remove this document from its website, so its contents cannot be directly verified, but Wikipedia provides the following summary:

    Duelfer Report

    On September 30, 2004, the ISG released the Duelfer Report, its final report on Iraq’s WMD programs. The main points of the report are as follows:

    * Iraq’s main goal was to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute WMD production.
    * Iraq’s WMD programs had decayed significantly since the end of the first Gulf War.
    * No senior Iraqi official interviewed by the ISG believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.
    * Iraq had no deployable WMD of any kind as of March 2003 and had no production since 1991.
    * The ISG judged that in March 2003, Iraq would have had the ability to produce large quantities of Sulfur Mustard in 3-6 months, and large quantities of nerve agent in 2 years.
    * There was no proof of any biological weapons stocks since 1991.
    * Iraq’s nuclear program was terminated in 1991, at which point micrograms of enriched uranium had been produced from a single test gas centrifuge.
    * Iraq had intended to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped, a prospect that the Iraqi government saw coming soon.
    * Smuggling was used by Iraq to rebuild as much of its WMD program as could be hidden from U.N. weapons inspectors.
    * Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items banned by sanctions.
    * Until March 2003, Saddam Hussein convinced his top military commanders that Iraq did indeed possess WMD that could be used against any U.S. invasion force, in order to prevent a coup over the prospects of fighting the U.S.-led Coalition without these weapons.
    * Iraq used procurement contracts allowed under the Oil for Food program to buy influence among U.N. Security Council member states including France, China, and Russia, as well as dozens of prominent journalists and anti-sanctions activists.
    * “The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.”
    * “Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary.”

    (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duelfer_Report#Duelfer_Report)

    Duelfer released several addenda to his report in March of last year, concluding that it was “unlikely” that Iraq transferred WMD material to Syria but that it could not be completely ruled out. In media interviews prior to the release of the addenda, ISG officials went on record as saying that they had seen no evidence that WMD material had been transferred to Syria prior to invasion. Thus, the report and the addenda concur with the “no WMD” position that many of us who oppose the war (especially those such as myself who were opposed to invading Iraq in the first place).

    The Ba’ath Government had very little, couldn’t use what it had, wasn’t in a position to make more, and had no plans to resume production should sanctions be lifted. Once again, Chuck has been busted.

  12. Erkki KochKetola said

    Gah, I hate the link limit. I’ll try again:

    Chuck is referring to the “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” commonly known as the Duelfer Report. Unfortunately, the CIA has seen fit to remove this document from its website, so its contents cannot be directly verified, but Wikipedia provides the following summary:

    Duelfer Report

    On September 30, 2004, the ISG released the Duelfer Report, its final report on Iraq’s WMD programs. The main points of the report are as follows:

    * Iraq’s main goal was to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute WMD production.
    * Iraq’s WMD programs had decayed significantly since the end of the first Gulf War.
    * No senior Iraqi official interviewed by the ISG believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.
    * Iraq had no deployable WMD of any kind as of March 2003 and had no production since 1991.
    * The ISG judged that in March 2003, Iraq would have had the ability to produce large quantities of Sulfur Mustard in 3-6 months, and large quantities of nerve agent in 2 years.
    * There was no proof of any biological weapons stocks since 1991.
    * Iraq’s nuclear program was terminated in 1991, at which point micrograms of enriched uranium had been produced from a single test gas centrifuge.
    * Iraq had intended to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped, a prospect that the Iraqi government saw coming soon.
    * Smuggling was used by Iraq to rebuild as much of its WMD program as could be hidden from U.N. weapons inspectors.
    * Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items banned by sanctions.
    * Until March 2003, Saddam Hussein convinced his top military commanders that Iraq did indeed possess WMD that could be used against any U.S. invasion force, in order to prevent a coup over the prospects of fighting the U.S.-led Coalition without these weapons.
    * Iraq used procurement contracts allowed under the Oil for Food program to buy influence among U.N. Security Council member states including France, China, and Russia, as well as dozens of prominent journalists and anti-sanctions activists.
    * “The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.”
    * “Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary.”

    Duelfer released several addenda to his report in March of last year, concluding that it was “unlikely” that Iraq transferred WMD material to Syria but that it could not be completely ruled out. In media interviews prior to the release of the addenda, ISG officials went on record as saying that they had seen no evidence that WMD material had been transferred to Syria prior to invasion. Thus, the report and the addenda concur with the “no WMD” position that many of us who oppose the war (especially those such as myself who were opposed to invading Iraq in the first place).

    The Ba’ath Government had very little, couldn’t use what it had, wasn’t in a position to make more, and had no plans to resume production should sanctions be lifted. Once again, Chuck has been busted.

  13. Erkki Kochketola said

    Erm, didn’t complete my sentence;

    Thus, the report and the addenda concur with the “no WMD” position that many of us who oppose the war (especially those such as myself who were opposed to invading Iraq in the first place) have articulated.

  14. Chuck Norton said

    Guys lol,

    Keep posting… I want you two to get really committed, before I blow you out of the water……

    Keep in mond that Saddam was supposed to give up the nuclear documents, the personal, the labs, the programs altogether and hand them over to Blix… he didnt do so. So the fact that he kept the intellectual core of his nuclear program from the first Gulf War till the invasion is yet another big violation on Saddam’s part.

    Andrew, you posted what David Kay said to NPR… how nice. However what you dont know is that David Kay’s statements under oath are often exactly the opposite to what he often tells the press. I have almost every word of David Kay’s under oath testimony in my archive. I will post more of it later just for fun… and you wont like it very much.

    Erkki, you said that the Duelfer Report was taken down from the CIA web site…. actually it was just moved to a new address…. happy hunting :-).

    But Alas…. lets just take another gander at a few words from Kay’s Interim Report to Congress…


    We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN.

    With regard to Iraq’s nuclear program, the testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons. They have told ISG that Saddam Hussein remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons.

    A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.

    New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.

    Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists’ homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).

    So much for Hans Blix…..

  15. Chuck Norton said

    By the way Erkki… you really should take the time to READ what you post BEFORE you cut and paste…..

    WHY??

    Here are three lines from your post above…


    * The ISG judged that in March 2003, Iraq would have had the ability to produce large quantities of Sulfur Mustard in 3-6 months, and large quantities of nerve agent in 2 years.

    * Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items banned by sanctions.

    {now Erkki’s words} The Ba’ath Government …had no plans to resume production should sanctions be lifted. Once again, Chuck has been busted.

    NO Erkki, once again no one has to take the time to serve you up on a platter because you have owned yourself.

  16. Hello all, I noticed that a bug in WordPress had resulted in many of the hyperlinks not being shown in our older articles. I am in the process of replacing them, which is going to be a long process as I will be doing this as time permits. I have reinserted the links in this piece and am also adding them in comments. [Craig, Jarrod and Marcus, if you see articles where your links have vanished please reinsert them at your leisure]

    Chuck Norton

    https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf

    Key Findings
    Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted.

    • Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq’s strategic policy.

    • Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.

    • The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.

    • By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.

    Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.

    • Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary.

    • Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire.

  17. http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/02/kay.report/

    We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN.

    With regard to Iraq’s nuclear program, the testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons. They have told ISG that Saddam Hussein remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons.

    A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.

    New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.

    Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists’ homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).

  18. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/03/world/middleeast/03documents.html?pagewanted=print

    On Sept. 20, the site posted a much larger document, “Summary of technical achievements of Iraq’s former nuclear program.” It runs to 51 pages, 18 focusing on the development of Iraq’s bomb design. Topics included physical theory, the atomic core and high-explosive experiments. By early October, diplomats and officials said, United Nations arms inspectors in New York and their counterparts in Vienna were alarmed and discussing what to do.

    The government had received earlier warnings about the contents of the Web site. Last spring, after the site began posting old Iraqi documents about chemical weapons, United Nations arms-control officials in New York won the withdrawal of a report that gave information on how to make tabun and sarin, nerve agents that kill by causing respiratory failure.

    The documents, he added, could perhaps help Iran or other nations making a serious effort to develop nuclear arms, but probably not terrorists or poorly equipped states. The official, who requested anonymity because of his agency’s rules against public comment, called the papers “a road map that helps you get from point A to point B, but only if you already have a car.”

    Among the dozens of documents in English were Iraqi reports written in the 1990’s and in 2002 for United Nations inspectors in charge of making sure Iraq abandoned its unconventional arms programs after the Persian Gulf war. Experts say that at the time, Mr. Hussein’s scientists were on the verge of building an atom bomb, as little as a year away.

  19. Saddam Gamed U.N. Oil Scheme in Bid for Arms
    http://www.nysun.com/foreign/saddam-gamed-un-oil-scheme-in-bid-for-arms/2673/

    WASHINGTON – Saddam Hussein personally approved the distribution of oil vouchers to raise funds for the purchase of weapons material, the final report of the American team of weapons inspectors in Iraq will say this week.

    According to internal talking points drafted by the National Security Council and obtained by The New York Sun, chief weapons inspector Charles Duelfer has concluded that the Iraqi dictator used a U.N. sanctions program that was aimed at curbing his desire for weapons of mass destruction to buy off countries and individuals to help Iraq weaken the sanctions.

    “The report shows U.N. sanctions eroding and increasingly ineffective. Saddam Hussein intended to reconstitute the weapons of mass destruction programs once they were eliminated. The Iraqi ministry of oil with the personal approval of Saddam Hussein used a secret oil voucher distribution system to attempt to influence other nations and individuals to support Iraq’s goals,” the talking points say.

    At the same time, Mr. Duelfer concludes that Iraq had significantly dismantled its nuclear program and was not producing chemical weapons at the time the American-led coalition launched the campaign in March 2003 to oust him from power. The report, however, says that Saddam preserved the intellectual capital of his old nuclear program and was only six months away from producing mustard gas.

    Mr. Duelfer’s report essentially confirms America’s charge that Saddam was not in compliance with the U.N. resolutions requiring that he disarm, according to the talking points. “At the start of operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam Hussein had the capacity to produce sulfur mustard within six months and the capability to produce nerve agents in significant quantities within two years,” the talking points say. It also says that his development of long-range missiles, banned under the 17 sanctions resolutions passed against Iraq between 1991 and 2003, continued unabated.

  20. Iraq Survey Group Lead Inspector Charles Duelfer’s televised under oath testimony:

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